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Abstract
In this paper we examine the extent of time-varying correlations among stock markets returns,
stock market implied volatility and policy uncertainty based on a newly introduced uncertainty
index by Baker et al. (2012). We find that the dynamic correlations of policy uncertainty and
stock market returns are consistently negative, apart from the period during the latest global
financial crisis, wherein correlations became positive. Furthermore, an increase in the volatility
of the stock market and the policy uncertainty dampens stock market returns, while it increases
policy uncertainty. Finally, aggregate demand oil price shocks and US recessions significantly affect
the correlation between policy uncertainty and stock market returns.
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1. Introduction
The foundations of the effects of policy uncertainty on the economy have been placed for more
than 30 years now (see, inter alia, Marcus, 1981; Bernanke, 1983; Aizenman and Marion, 1991;
Rodrik, 1991). Nevertheless, the interest in the effects of policy has resurged especially after the
advent of the 2007 financial crisis. Authors mainly focus their attention on the examination of the
effects of policy uncertainty on macroeconomic variables, such as growth, inflation and investment
(see, Bloom, 2009; Baum et al., 2010; Bachmann et al., 2010; Jones and Olson, 2013, among
others). Arguably, in the presence of uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of the macroeconomic
policies, rational agents will withhold their investment decision (considering that these investments
are either completely or partly irreversible) until the uncertainty is removed. Thus, the general
consensus is that uncertainty has a negative effect on the level of growth and investment. The
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effect of uncertainty on inflation is less clear-cut as it depends on international shocks, such as oil
price shocks, according to Jones and Olson (2013).
The aim of this paper is to contribute towards the study of the effects of macroeconomic policy
uncertainty on the economy, focusing on its effects on stock market performance. In particular,
we explore the dynamic co-movements between macroeconomic policy uncertainty, stock market
returns and stock market (implied) volatility using the newly introduced index of macroeconomic
uncertainty by Baker et al. (2012) and a more elaborate measure of correlations.
To achieve that, we construct time-varying measures of correlations among policy uncertainty,
stock market returns and stock market (implied) volatility based on the dynamic conditional cor-
relation (DCC) model of Engle (2002). Taking into account both time variation and conditional
heterogeneity in correlations, the proposed measure has several advantages compared to other com-
monly used measures. It is able to distinguish negative correlations due to episodes in single years,
synchronous behavior during stable years and asynchronous behavior in turbulent years. Unlike
rolling windows, an alternative way to capture time variability, the proposed measure does not suf-
fer from the so called “ghost features”, as the effects of a shock are not reflected in m consecutive
periods, with m being the window span. In addition, under the proposed measure there is neither
need to set a window span, nor loss of observations, nor is there a requirement for subsample
estimation.
Our results based on monthly data between January 1985 and January 2013 suggest that dy-
namic correlations between policy uncertainty and stock market returns are consistently negative,
apart from the period during the latest financial crisis, wherein dynamic correlations became pos-
itive. In addition, an increase in the volatility of the stock market and the policy uncertainty
dampens stock market returns, while increases policy uncertainty. Last but not least, aggregate
demand shocks are negatively associated with dynamic correlations, whereas dynamic correlations
reveal heterogeneous patterns during US recessions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the methodology.
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical findings, and Section 5 summarizes
and concludes the paper.
2. Methodology
In order to examine the evolution of co-movements between policy uncertainty, stock market returns
and stock market (implied) volatility, we obtain a time-varying measure of correlation based on
the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model of Engle (2002).
Let yt = [y1t, y2t]
′ be a 2×1 vector comprising the data series. The conditional mean equations
are then represented by:
A(L)yt = εt, where εt|Ωt−1 ∼ N(0, Ht), and t = 1, ..., T (1)
where A is a matrix, L the lag operator and εt is the vector of innovations based on the information
set, Ω, available at time t − 1. The εt vector has the following conditional variance-covariance
matrix:
Ht = DtRtDt, (2)
where Dt = diag
√
hit is a 2 × 2 matrix containing the time-varying standard deviations obtained
from univariate GARCH(p,q) models and Rt = ρij t =
qij,t√
qii,tqjj,t
where i, j = 1, 2 is the 2×2 matrix
comprising the conditional correlations and which are our main focus.
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3. Data
The data used in this study are the policy uncertainty index series, the implied volatility
index of S&P500 (VIX) and the S&P500 returns. The former series comes from Baker et al.
(2012) and measures policy-related economic uncertainty in the United States. In particular,
it’s a constructed index based on three components. The first component quantifies newspaper
coverage of policy-related economic uncertainty. The second component reflects the number of
federal tax code provisions set to expire in future years. The third component uses disagreement
among economic forecasters as a proxy for uncertainty. The VIX data series is obtained from
Datastream. The S&P500 returns series is obtained from FRED database and defined as the
annualized monthly change of the natural logarithm of S&P500 index, and given by: 1200 ×
(log(S&P500t) − log(S&P500t−1)). Our sample ranges from January 1985 to January 2013 (337
observations).
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the policy uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2012), the VIX
and the S&P500 returns. According to this figure, we observe that peaks of the uncertainty index
to be associated with abrupt changes in stock market returns. A feature which we explore further
below. In addition, there is an increasing pattern in the policy uncertainty index, beginning to
emerge since the outbreak of the financial crisis in mid-2007.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of our data series. According to this table, we observe
large variability in our main variables. The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test with just a
constant indicates that S&P500 returns are stationary (as the null hypothesis of a unit root process
is rejected), while uncertainty contains a unit root. Nevertheless, policy uncertainty is stationary
in levels with a structural break taking place in August 2007, according to the Zivot and Andrews
(1992) unit root test –a fact that was also observed informally by looking at Figure 1. The fact that
the ARCH-LM test rejects the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity for each series suggests that it is
appropriate to model these series as an ARCH-type process. Finally, the unconditional correlation
between policy uncertainty and S&P500 returns is negative, while all remaining unconditional
correlations are positive.
4. Estimation Results
Table 2 reports the results of the three bivariate DCC models. Panels A and B present the
conditional mean and variance results, respectively, while Panel C contains the Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics on the standardized and squared standardized residuals, respectively, up to 12 lags. The
choice of the lag length of the autoregressive process (AR) process of the conditional mean (CM) is
based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian criterion (BIC) and serves
to remove any serial correlation in the standardized residuals. The conditional variance of the series
and a dummy variable, D, that equals 1 for the period of August 2007 onwards and 0 otherwise
(to account for the upward trend in the uncertainty index in that period) are included whenever
appropriate.
According to the results of the first model between policy uncertainty and stock market returns
in Table 2, we observe that increased stock market conditional volatility increases policy uncertainty
and dampens stock markets returns, while increases in the volatility of policy uncertainty lead to
negative stock market returns and increased policy uncertainty. The dummy variable is significantly
positive justifying the fact that uncertainty is higher in the post-August 2007 period.
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There is an ongoing discussion on the fact that, even though the implied volatility index, VIX,
has followed a declining trend since the peak of the latest financial crisis – and which is in line with
the theory that uncertainty in the stock markets is being resolved after a crash (see, for instance,
Hong and Stein, 2003; Zeira, 1999; Lee, 1998; Caplin and Leahy, 1994; Romer, 1993) –, we cannot
observe the same pattern for the policy uncertainty index. On the contrary, the policy uncertainty
index follows an increasing trend, which may the reason be hampering the recovery in the United
States. We examine the interdependencies of policy uncertainty and the VIX in model 2 of Table
2. Finally, for robustness purposes we examine interdependencies between S&P500 returns and
the VIX. Model 3 in Table 2 presents these results. One lag of the S&P500 returns and the VIX
was enough to filter any remaining correlation. We observe that in addition to the conditional
volatility (see Model 1), the implied volatility index has a significantly negative (positive) effect
on stock market returns (the VIX), as well. Finally, S&P500 returns have a significantly positive
effect on S&P500 returns but no significant impact on the VIX.1
In Figure 2, we present the dynamic conditional correlations of the three models estimated in
Table 2, along with their 90% confidence intervals. The time-varying correlation between policy
uncertainty and stock market returns is consistently negative over time, apart from the period
during the latest global financial crisis, wherein correlations became positive. A plausible expla-
nation why the correlation in the later part of the financial crisis did not behave as expected can
be found in the unprecedented bailout package for the US banking sector of 2008 and the stimulus
package of 2009. Even though the policy uncertainty remains high after these two packages, the
stock market responded favourably, considering that in the later part of the financial crisis the
market was experiencing positive returns.
Looking at the time-varying correlations between policy uncertainty and the VIX, we observe
the following regularities. First, correlations fluctuate substantially over the sample period. More
importantly, we observe that the correlations return to, or even exceed, the pre-recession levels,
following the 1991 and 2001 U.S. recessions. However, in the case of the latest recession of 2007-09,
correlations are yet to reach pre-crisis levels. On the contrary, they became negative from the
second half of the 2007-09 recession and until mid-2010. These developments could be explained
by the fact that although stock market uncertainty (lower variation in stock market returns and
lower implied volatility - see Figure 1) has declined since the latest global recession (apart from few
spikes in June 2010, October 2011 and June 2012), the policy uncertainty has not followed suit.
Thus, the unusually high levels of policy uncertainty might have been, among others, an important
factor hampering the recovery in the United States.
Finally, the dynamic correlation between stock market returns and VIX is negative throughout
the sample period and it seems to follow a declining trend. In addition, stock market crashes
(Black Monday of 1987, Russian financial crisis of 1998 and the latest financial crisis of 2008) are
associated with sharp declines in the correlation levels.
An important question that arises is what explains the evolution of these dynamic correlations.
In order to tackle this issue, we apply a Fisher transformation on the estimated time-varying
correlations, ρt, between policy uncertainty, VIX and stock market returns according to DCt =
log((1+ρt)/(1−ρt)), so as to ensure our dependent variable is not confined to the interval [−1, 1],2
1All three model specifications in Table 2 do not suffer from serial correlation in the squared (standardized)
residuals according to the misspecification tests in Panel C of Table 2.
2The results are not sensitive to this transformation though.
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and estimate various specifications of the following model:
DCt = α+ βDCt−1 + γOil Shockst + δDomestic Shockst + θUS Recessionst + t, (3)
where α is a constant, Oil Shockst is a vector of three oil price shocks
3, Domestic Shockst is a
vector of domestic shocks, namely, US industrial production growth and inflation so as to account
for changes in the real economy not captured by the oil shock variables, US Recessionst is a
dummy variable that equals 1 during US recessions, as defined by NBER, and 0 otherwise, and
t is the innovation. Finally, one lag of the dependent variable, DCt−1, is included to account for
first-order serial correlation in our transformed variable.
Table 3 presents the results of the various forms of model (3). Under Columns (1)–(4), we
examine the effects of oil price shocks without including any of the domestic shocks or US recessions
dummy variables. We find that only the aggregate demand shocks have a negative and significant
effect on dynamic correlation, suggesting that this specific oil price shock pushes the correlation
to lower values. This is plausible as positive aggregate demand shocks (which result due to global
economic growth) would decrease the policy uncertainty of the macroeconomic policies and increase
stock returns. Under Columns (5)–(12), we also add the domestic shocks to account for changes
in the real economy not captured by international factors. We find that even after controling for
domestic factors the results remain robust. Finally, under columns (13)–(14), we include dummy
variables for the US recessions.4 Our results reveal that US recessions do not seem to impact the
dynamic correlation unless we isolate the effects of individual recession periods. Interestingly, the
impact of the latest financial crisis is positive and significant, while the reverse holds true for the
1991 and 2001 recessions. This is indicative of the unique features of the 2007–09 financial crisis
(Claessens et al., 2010; Antonakakis, 2012).5
5. Conclusion
The focal point of this study is the extent of time-varying correlations among stock market
returns, implied volatility and policy uncertainty. In particular, we employ the S&P500 returns, the
VIX and the policy uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2012) that has recently gained considerable
attention. Results show that the dynamic correlation between policy uncertainty and stock market
returns is consistently negative over time, apart from the latest financial crisis. Moreover, an
increase in the volatility of the stock market and the policy uncertainty dampens stock market
returns, while it increases policy uncertainty. Finally, aggregate demand shocks are negatively
associated with dynamic correlations, whereas dynamic correlations reveal heterogeneous patterns
during US recessions.
A potential avenue for future research is to examine whether a similar pattern can be observed
for European economies.
3Oil price shocks have been estimated using the framework developed by Kilian (2009). Kilian (2009) identifies
three oil price shocks (namely, supply-side shocks, aggregate demand shocks and oil specific demand shocks). Supply-
side shocks are associated with changes in the world oil production, aggregate demand shocks are associated with
changes in the global economic activity and oil specific demand shocks are associated with concerns about the future
availability of oil.
4To achieve that, we include a dummy variable reflecting all three recessions, and three individual dummy variables
for the 1991, 2001 and 2007 US recessions, in Table 3 under specifications (13) and (14), respectively.
5As a robustness analysis, we repeated the estimation with the remaining two time-varying correlations. Our
main conclusions remain similar. These results are available upon request.
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Figure 1: Baker et al. (2012) Uncertainty index, S&P500 Returns and Implied Volatility Index (VIX)
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Uncertainty VIX S&P500 Returns
Min 57.519 10.31 -296.21
Mean 107.38 20.697 7.8428
Max 246.47 68.51 175.34
Std 33.13 7.8615 56.222
ADFa (constant) -2.3530 -4.1506** -7.4227**
Zivot-Andrewsb -5.3401**
ARCH(12) LM Test 74.873** 30.707** 4.2361**
Unconditional Correlations
Uncertainty 1.0000
VIX 0.4274 1.0000
S&P500 Returns -0.1830 -0.4082 1.0000
Note:
a The 5% and 1% critical values are -2.86 and -3.43, respectively.
b The estimated break date is August 2007.
* and ** indicate significance at 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2: Estimation results of bivariate DCC-GARCH models, Period: 1985M1 – 2013M1
Panel A: Conditional mean
Model 1: Model 2: Model 3:
Uncertainty & S&P500 Uncertainty & VIX S&P500 & VIX
ut spt ut vixt spt vixt
Cons 13.838*** -9.644 Cons 15.719*** 3.730*** Cons 0.003 3.42***
(3.264) (11.973) (3.743) (0.779) (1.716) (0.147)
ut−1 0.702*** -0.595*** ut−1 0.647*** 0.065*** spt−1 0.084** -0.000
(0.062) (0.138) (0.051) (0.011) (0.041) (0.003)
ut−2 0.106 0.143 ut−2 0.110* -0.006 vixt−1 -0.412*** 0.822***
(0.068) (0.184) (0.065) (0.013) (0.041) (0.006)
ut−3 -0.199*** 0.561*** ut−3 -0.119** -0.042***
(0.065) (0.159) (0.056) (0.011)
ut−4 0.214*** 0.065 ut−4 0.146*** -0.030
(0.046) (0.135) (0.049) (0.010)
hut 0.002*** -0.068*** vixt−1 0.259* 0.004***
(0.005) (0.017) (0.13) (0.001)
hspt 0.001*** -0.008*** hut -0.001 0.798***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.032)
D 12.633*** D 13.697***
(2.430) (2.529)
Panel B: Conditional variance: Ht = Γ
′Γ +A′t−1′t−1A+B′Ht−1B
γ 29.401** 1395.664*** 35.514** 5.344*** 98.280*** 7.929***
(11.863) (175.353) (15.783) (1.157) (19.932) (0.222)
α1 0.312*** 0.271*** 0.336*** 0.709*** 0.137*** 0.155***
(0.071) (0.073) (0.070) (0.159) (0.009) (0.022)
β2 0.631*** 0.221*** 0.614*** 0.187*** 0.823*** 0.373***
(0.065) (0.054) (0.066) (0.068) (0.006) (0.014)
a 0.077*** (0.061) 0.065** (0.031) 0.025*** (0.001)
b 0.849*** (0.127) 0.933*** (0.033) 0.975*** (0.001)
Panel C: Misspecification tests
Q(12) 18.4657 8.0964 17.9388 16.4735 8.2212 8.7899
[0.1023] [0.7776] [0.1176] [0.1705] [0.7676] [0.7208]
Q2(12) 8.4881 6.0645 7.7822 4.2535 5.0293 5.3973
[0.7459] [0.9128] [0.8019] [0.9784] [0.9570] [0.9412]
Note: ut, spt, vixt, hut and hspt denote policy uncertainty, S&P500 returns, implied volatility index (VIX), condi-
tional variance of uncertainty and conditional variance of S&P500 returns, respectively, at time t. D is a dummy
variable that equals one for t ≥ August 2007 and zero otherwise. Q(12) and Q2(12) are the Ljung-Box Q-Statistics
on the standardized and squared standardized residuals, respectively, up to 12 lags. Standard Errors in parenthesis
and p-values in square brackets. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and the 10
percent level, respectively.
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